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I. INTRODUCTION
When a U.S. warship shot down an enemy fighter plane in a naval
operation in 1988,1 the fighter plane turned out to be a commercial airliner
transporting 290 civilians, all of whom died.2 The civilians’ next of kin sued
the U.S. government on the grounds of negligence.3 The United States
maintained the matter constituted a political question.4 However, in Koohi
v. United States,5 the appeals court disagreed and without restraint, said, “the
federal courts are capable of reviewing military decisions, particularly when
those decisions cause injury to civilians. The controlling case is The Paquete
Habana.”6 The Koohi proposition7 oversimplifies the law.

* Senior Staff Attorney & Senior Program Manager, The Veterans Consortium Pro Bono
Program; Major, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve; Instructor, Law of War Training Section, Headquarters
Marine Corps. LL.M., National Security Law, 2016, Georgetown University Law Center; J.D., 2010,
Howard University School of Law; B.A. (moral & political philosophy), 2007, University of Cincinnati.
Admitted to practice law in New York, DC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims, and the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Views expressed are the author’s alone and do not
represent views of The Veterans Consortium or the Department of Defense or its components. All
mistakes and shortcomings are also the author’s alone. The author extends special thanks to David
Stewart, Professor from Practice, and Mary DeRosa, Professor from Practice, Georgetown University
Law Center. The author also thanks his wife and best friend Doreen, who by love and devotion makes
all things possible.
1. Samuel J. Cox, H-018-1: No Higher Honor—The Road to Operation Praying Mantis, 18 April 1988,
NAVAL HIST. & HERITAGE COMMAND (May 8, 2019, 10:41 AM), https://www.history.navy.mil/
about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-018/h-018-1.html [https://perma.
cc/3528-2QV6].
2. Id.
3. Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1330 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiffs also alleged design
defects in the warship’s weapon system. Id. The ultimate issue in Koohi was domestic sovereign
immunity. While both the Federal Tort Claims Act and the Public Vessels Act waive the federal
government’s sovereign immunity, only the Tort Claims Act includes exceptions for combatant
activities and discretionary functions. Still, the Ninth Circuit in Koohi applied the combatant activities
exception to the Public Vessels Act, finding that, “Under those circumstances, a ‘time of war’ exists, at
least for purposes of domestic tort law.” Id. at 1335. Its rationale: “The [Federal Tort Claims Act’s]
combatant activities exception specifically covers activities of naval and Coast Guard vessels. Unless
a similar exception is read into the [Public Vessels Act], this specification will be rendered nearly
meaningless.” Id. at 1336.
4. Id. at 1331.
5. Id. at 1328.
6. Id. at 1331 (citing The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900)). The only other case the Ninth
Circuit referred to was Scheuer v. Rhodes, a case concerning the employment of the national guard during
“the incident at Kent State,” a police action on American soil. Id. (citing Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S.
232, 247–49 (1974)). According to the Ninth Circuit in Koohi: “These cases make clear that the claim
of military necessity will not, without more, shield governmental operations from judicial review.” Id.
7. Id.
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Federal courts typically apply the political question doctrine to matters of
Commander-in-Chief discretion. Yet, the Koohi proposition persists.8
Worse, it relies on an error.
The error of the Paquete Habana9 is the Supreme Court’s failure to
consider whether the case concerned a matter of wartime military
discretion.10 Due to this error, the Court failed to consider the political
question doctrine.
If the Koohi proposition indicates the import of the Paquete Habana, the
error threatens to have a chilling effect on military operations.11 This is the
8. See, e.g., Tarros S.p.A. v. United States, 982 F. Supp. 2d 325, 337 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (“While
Habana and Koohi add a wrinkle to the analysis in this case, they do not change the result.”).
9. Although decided in 1900, the U.S. Supreme Court case of the Paquete Habana has remained
a staple of the jurisprudence of U.S. foreign relations law well beyond the terrorist attacks of
September 11th, 2001. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (FOURTH) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW §§ 406 n.3,
421 n.7 (AM. LAW INST. 2017). Courts have relied on it most for its proposition that “international
law is part of our law” and the passages that follow. United States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 92 (2d Cir.
2003) (“It has long been established that customary international law is part of the law of the United
States to [a] limited extent.”). So, in the interplay of international law and U.S. law, the Paquete Habana
stands out as a landmark case. In addition, preeminent national security lawyer and scholar Jamie Baker
has added the Paquete Habana to a short list of national security cases which represents the body of case
law with which every national security generalist should be familiar. JAMES E. BAKER, IN THE
COMMON DEFENSE: NATIONAL SECURITY LAW FOR PERILOUS TIMES 348 n.1 (2007). It also
appears in several places in the Department of Defense Law of War Manual published in 2015, the goto source for the DoD Office of General Counsel’s interpretation of the law of war. OFF. OF GEN.
COUNS., DEP’T OF DEF., DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE LAW OF WAR MANUAL 81 n.178 (June 2015),
https://ogc.osd.mil/Portals/99/department_of_defense_law_of_war_manual%20%281%29.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2W38-6XXE] [hereinafter DEP’T OF DEFENSE, LAW OF WAR MANUAL].
10. “Wartime military discretion” refers to actions undertaken in the conduct of hostilities—
in the parlance of the law of armed conflict, measures implicating the jus in bello of the law of war—
in declared or authorized war. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 9, at 43. This is in
contrast to Commander-in-Chief discretion, which refers to measures implicating jus in bello in
undeclared war, or war without congressional authorization.
11. Brief of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Defendants and Dismissal at 2, Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2010), (No. 1:10-cv01469-JDB), 2010 WL 4974321 (“The VFW [Veterans of Foreign Wars] agrees with the Government’s
arguments regarding why this suit is barred, including by the political question doctrine. Rather than
repeating those arguments, this amicus brief seeks to add perspective to the reasons why suits like the
present action would threaten national security by interfering with ongoing military operations.
Allowing this case to proceed would contravene the core military principle of ‘unity of command,’ and
undermine the military’s chain of command, creating uncertainty for subordinate leaders and soldiers.
Such litigation also would adversely affect unit cohesion, the glue which binds small units together in
the heat of battle, and enables them to survive and accomplish their missions. Further, litigation of
cases such as this would undermine battlefield decisionmaking by subjecting tactical, operational and
strategic decisions to second-guessing by courts far removed from the battlefield. And, to the extent
this case will involve the activities of special operations forces, the VFW urges the Court to tread with
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Koohi problem. Therefore, the principal aim of this Article is to test the Koohi
proposition. And because the Paquete Habana error is the basis of the Koohi
proposition, addressing the Koohi problem requires examining this
foundational error.
First, this Article examines the Paquete Habana error, offering an outline
of the opinion and an overview of points the opinion either overlooked or
minimized in its rationale—points that should have shaped the Court’s
decision.
The Article goes on to explain the error in Section III, including an
overview of judicial review and the political question doctrine. This
overview demonstrates how the Paquete Habana, while right in its result, was
wrong in its rationale.
In the fourth section, the Article considers judicial review12 on matters
of Commander-in-Chief discretion, noting the Supreme Court cases of
Youngstown13 and Baker v. Carr.14 These cases urge federal courts to defer
on matters of Commander-in-Chief discretion by operation of the political
question doctrine.
In Section V, the Article considers more recent cases—Tarros S.p.A. v.
United States15 and Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States16—to show how the
Paquete Habana error still obscures the application of judicial review in
matters of Commander-in-Chief discretion and emphasizes the importance
of the Paquete Habana error. But these cases also show that the federal

particular caution, because of the need to protect the extremely sensitive sources and methods utilized
by our nation’s elite forces.”). See generally Jack Goldsmith, Phillip Carter on VFW Brief Supporting
Government in Al-Aulaqi, LAWFARE (Oct. 6, 2010, 11:14 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/phillipcarter-vfw-brief-supporting-government-al-aulaqi [https://perma.cc/K6JN-QQ2R] (“Briefly stated,
the VFW’s brief agrees with the Government’s motion to dismiss on, inter alia, political question
grounds, but seeks to supplement the Court’s understanding of why the political question doctrine
matters so much in the sphere of military operations, particularly with respect to special operations
such as those at issue.”) (emphasis in original).
12. Throughout, “judicial review” refers to the power of the federal civilian courts of the United
States. War crimes tribunals and courts-martial are beyond the scope of this Article. If the actions of
a naval officer or other military officer in the conduct of hostilities should be subject to judicial review,
it should be the judicial review of courts-martial. “Safe harbor” does not mean allowed to act with absolute
impunity, but in accordance with the lex specialis of the law of war. See DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR
MANUAL, supra note 9, at 9 (“[T]he law of war is the lex specialis governing armed conflict.”).
13. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
14. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
15. Tarros S.p.A. v. United States, 982 F. Supp. 2d 325 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
16. Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 777 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2015).
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judiciary can manage its duty of judicial review and maintain the proper
separation of powers by undertaking the appropriate discriminating analysis.
II. EXAMINING THE ERROR
On 15 February 1898, the U.S. warship USS Maine exploded in Havana
Harbor.17 More than 250 U.S. Sailors and Marines died.18 Suspicion
spread that a seaborne mine had caused the explosion.19 The press blamed
Spain, and the people called for war.20 On 20 April, Congress passed a joint
resolution authorizing military force,21 enabling President William
McKinley to order a blockade along the northern coast of Cuba on
22 April.22 On 25 April, Congress passed the formal declaration of war,
17. The Sinking of Maine, NAVAL HIST. & HERITAGE COMMAND (Aug. 17, 2020, 1:06 PM),
https://www.history.navy.mil/browse-by-topic/disasters-and-phenomena/destruction-of-uss-maine.
html [https://perma.cc/SMH3-U69Z].
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. The swell of public furor grew under the clamor of “Remember the Maine! To hell with
Spain!” Samuel J. Cox, H-015-3: “Remember the Maine! To Hell with Spain!”, NAVAL HIST. & HERITAGE
COMMAND (May 3, 2019, 10:47 AM), https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/nhhc/aboutus/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-015/h-015-3.html [https://perma.cc/ZR
3D-AU2X]. Although it galvanized public opinion in favor of war, the sinking of the Maine was not
the war’s principal cause. See, e.g., JENNIFER K. ELSEA & MATTHEW C. WEED, CONG. RSCH. SERV.,
RL31133, DECLARATIONS OF WAR AND AUTHORIZATIONS FOR THE USE OF MILITARY FORCE:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 2 (2014) (“The circumstances of
President McKinley’s request for a declaration of war against Spain in 1898 stand in singular contrast
to all the others. McKinley’s request for a declaration of war on April 25, 1898, was approved by a
voice vote of both Houses of Congress on that date. His request was made after Spain had rejected a
U.S. ultimatum that Spain relinquish its sovereignty over Cuba and permit Cuba to become an
independent state. This ultimatum was supported by a joint resolution of Congress, signed into law
on April 20, 1898, that among other things, declared Cuba to be independent, demanded that Spain
withdraw its military forces from the island, and directed and authorized the President to use the U.S.
Army, Navy and militia of the various states to achieve these ends. The war with Spain in 1898, in
short, was not principally based on attacks on the United States but on a U.S. effort to end the Cuban
insurrection against Spain, bring about Cuban independence, and restore a stable government and
order on the island—outcomes that were believed by the United States to advance its interests.”).
21. Act of Apr. 20, 1898, Pub. L. No. 55-24, 30 Stat. 738 (“Joint Resolution For the recognition
of the independence of the people of Cuba, demanding that the Government of Spain relinquish its
authority and government in the Island of Cuba, and to withdraw its land and naval forces from Cuba
and Cuban waters, and directing the President of the United States to use the land and naval forces of
the United States to carry these resolutions into effect.”).
22. According to Naval History and Heritage Command, “The blockade of Northern Cuba
became the early lynchpin of the American strategy.” Blockade of Northern Cuba, NAVAL HIST.
& HERITAGE COMMAND, https://www.history.navy.mil/research/publications/documentary-histor
ies/united-states-navy-s/blockade-of-northern.html [https://perma.cc/3BLS-Y2WF]; see FRENCH
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and the declaration recognized that a state of war had existed since the
21 April.23 The error of the Paquete Habana is that the Court failed to
recognize the issue as implicating wartime military discretion.
John Long, the Secretary of the Navy, issued the blockade order, ordering
the interdicting of Spanish ships and certain neutral ships.24 The Secretary
communicated this order to the U.S. Navy’s North Atlantic Squadron
commander, Admiral William T. Sampson, who instituted the blockade.25
The next day, the President announced that the blockade had been ordered
and would be maintained “in pursuance of the laws of the United States,
and the laws of [n]ations applicable to such cases.”26
There had been preparations earlier than 20 April. On 6 April,
Secretary Long telegraphed to then-Commodore Sampson with the
following directives: (1) “In the event of hostilities with Spain, the
Department wishes you to do all in your power to capture or destroy the
Spanish war vessels in West Indian waters, including the small gunboats
which are stationed along the coast of Cuba;” (2) “[I]n case of war, you will
maintain a strict blockade of Cuba, particularly at the ports of Havana,
ENSOR CHADWICK, THE RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND SPAIN: THE SPANISHAMERICAN WAR 55 (1911) (“A blockade of the Cuban coast and military assistance of the insurgents
ashore by supplying arms and munitions of war, or by sending armed forces, were thus the first steps
to be considered. The Spanish troops efficiently blockaded both by sea and land, and under the ravaged
conditions of the island, would succumb finally by mere starvation should not aid come by sea.”); see
also The Question of Blockade, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1898, https://www.nytimes.com/1898/
04/06/archives/the-question-of-blockade.html [https://perma.cc/HA2Q-NPSH] (“[A]n early step
on the part of the United States would be closing the ports of Havana and Matanzas, if no others. This
would essentially be a prelude to their capture, but, independent of capture, the shutting out of food
and other supplies from the districts now occupied by the only available Spanish military force, and
the prevention of its reinforcement, would require a blockade. . . . [A] blockade of Havana and
Matanzas would not only be of the highest advantage, but would be decisive.”).
23. Act of Apr. 25, 1898, ch. 189, 30 Stat. 364.
24. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712–15 (1900); see Proclamation of Blockade by
President William McKinley, transmitted by John D. Long, Sec’y of Navy, to James M. Forsyth,
Commandant, Key West Naval Base (Apr. 22 1898), https://www.history.navy.mil/content/history/
nhhc/research/publications/documentary-histories/united-states-navy-s/blockade-of-northern/secr
etary-of-the-nav-2.html [https://perma.cc/Q8Z5-DSQN] [hereinafter President McKinley’s
Proclamation of Blockade to Forsyth] (proclaiming neutral vessels approaching Cuban ports would be
subject to blockade measures).
25. It was only on 21 April, in preparation for war, that the President made Sampson an admiral
and gave him command of the North Atlantic Squadron. CHADWICK, supra note 22, at 129–30 (“The
reception of this telegram was equivalent to information that war was declared, inasmuch as under the
law the president could only make such an assignment in war.”).
26. President McKinley’s Proclamation of Blockade to Forsyth, supra note 24 (footnote
omitted).
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Matanzas;” and (3) “All prizes should be sent to Key West or other available
United States ports for adjudication.”27
Standing out against this background is the case of the Paquete Habana.
A. A Case of War
After setting up the blockade, the squadron seized two boats off Havana
Harbor sailing under the Spanish flag and seized them.28 The sailors
searched the ships and found the crewmen to be Cuban fishermen, the ships
laden with live fish.29 Yet, as Admiral Sampson observed, these Cuban
fishermen were also reservists of the Spanish navy.30 The Admiral ordered
the squadron to detain the men as prisoners of war and take the ships to the
army garrison at Key West.31
On behalf of the United States, a U.S. attorney filed a petition calling
upon the prize court to decide the propriety of the captures under prize
law.32 The district court condemned the ships as a lawful prize and had
them auctioned.33 The captives’ appointed lawyer appealed on their behalf,
based on a rule of international law that exempted coastal fishing vessels
27. Letter from John D. Long, Sec’y of the Navy, to William T. Sampson, Rear Admiral, U.S.
Navy, Commander of the N. Atl. Squadron (Apr. 6, 1898), https://www.history.navy.mil/
content/history/nhhc/research/publications/documentary-histories/united-states-navy-s/naval-ope
rations-in/secretary-of-the-nav-10.html [https://perma.cc/GS8V-C468].
28. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 678.
29. Id. at 679.
30. Id. at 713. Also important, the men “had a fishing license from the Spanish government.”
Id. at 679. They were fishing to feed the Spanish forces off Havana. See CHADWICK, supra note 22,
at 147 (detailing the movements and purposes of different foreign vessels). For more on the Admiral’s
observation about the crewmen as reservists of the Spanish navy, see infra note 56.
31. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 713.
32. Id. at 679. Some background remarks are appropriate on prize law. Captures at sea during
wartime are considered under prize law and adjudicated in prize courts. FRANCIS H. UPTON, THE
LAW OF NATIONS AFFECTING COMMERCE DURING WAR: WITH A REVIEW OF THE JURISDICTION,
PRACTICE AND PROCEEDINGS OF PRIZE COURTS 383 (1863) (“In the United States and Great Britain,
the exclusive jurisdiction of maritime captures is vested in courts of admiralty, which in the exercise of
this power are usually denominated prize courts.”). Prize courts have jurisdiction to determine whether
the property captured is or is not lawful prize under the law of nations. Id. at 388 (“The prize
jurisdiction of a court of admiralty, is that which authorizes it to take cognizance of captures made on
the sea, jure belli; of captures in foreign ports and harbors . . . . for the purpose of determining whether
the property captured or surrendered, is or is not lawful prize of war . . . .”). To call for such
adjudication, a libel and claim are filed in the prize court setting out the facts comprising the
circumstances of the capture, and a hearing is held. Id. at 406 (“In all cases, the hearing in the first
instance, is upon the libel and claim, the ship’s papers and documents found on board, and the
examination of the master and officers and crew of the captured vessel.”).
33. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 679.
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from capture as prizes.34 Based on an 1891 statute conferring jurisdiction,
the appeal went “direct to the Supreme Court.”35
1.

The Rule and the Exception

The Supreme Court took up the case on “the question [of] whether, upon
the facts appearing in these records, the fishing smacks were subject to
capture by the armed vessels of the United States during the recent war with
Spain.”36 The Court considered the rule under the law of nations that
exempted coastal fishing vessels from condemnation as prizes. As the Court
explained: “By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries
ago, and gradually ripening into a rule of international law, coast fishing
vessels, pursuing their vocation of catching and bringing in fresh fish, have
been recognized as exempt, with their cargoes and crews, from capture as
prize of war.”37 The rule was far from absolute and had an exception for
military necessity—an exception the Court failed to apply.38
As the Court acknowledged, the rule “does not apply to coast fishermen
or their vessels, if employed for a warlike purpose, or in such a way as to
give aid or information to the enemy; nor when military or naval operations
create a necessity to which all private interests must give way.”39 As
evidence of the general rule, the Court noted relevant passages from “the
works of jurists and commentators,”40 no fewer than five of which included
language implying the military necessity exception.41 According to the
Court: “No international jurist of the present day ha[d] a wider or more
deserved reputation than [Argentine scholar Carlos] Calvo,” and even Calvo
emphasized the military necessity exception to the general rule.42
Nevertheless, the Court overlooked a critical fact when applying the rule.
The taking of the ships was attendant to the apprehension of the fishermen
34. Id. at 679, 686; see Act of July 17, 1862, ch. CCIV, § 12, 12 Stat. 608 (“[T]he Secretary of the
Navy is hereby authorized to appoint an agent or to employ counsel when the captors do not employ
counsel themselves, in any case in which he may consider it necessary to assist the district attorneys
and protect the interests of the captors . . . .”).
35. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826. The 1891 statute also allowed direct appeal
to the U.S. Supreme Court in any case concerning the constitutionality of laws. Id.
36. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 686. The “smacks” were the Paquete Habana and the Lola.
37. Id. at 686.
38. Id. at 706 (“[N]o jurist would seriously argue that their immunity must be respected if they
were used for warlike purposes . . . .”).
39. Id. at 708.
40. Id. at 700.
41. Id. at 702–04.
42. Id. at 703.
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as prisoners of war. This nuance implicated the military necessity exception
to the exemption.43 On its own volition, the Court appropriately
43. This was beyond the scope of prize jurisdiction because prize jurisdiction was only
concerned with the issue of prize and incidental torts. UPTON, supra note 32, at 388–89. “The federal
courts, in exercising prize jurisdiction, exercise a considerable control over the navy in time of war.
They not only return captured vessels and cargoes not liable to condemnation under international law,
but decree damages against naval officers for illegal captures.” Quincy Wright, The Control of the Foreign
Relations of the United States: The Relative Rights, Duties, and Responsibilities of the President, of the Senate and the
House, and of the Judiciary, in Theory and in Practice, 60 PROC. OF THE AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 99, 259 (1921)
(citing Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170 (1804), for the point on damages against naval officers). Awarding
damages for illegal captures was within the jurisdiction of prize courts. UPTON, supra note 32,
at 388–89. However, judging the propriety of the taking of prisoners of war was not within that
jurisdiction. It is worth noting that the counsel for the United States, Henry M. Hoyt, Assistant
Attorney General (and soon-to-be Solicitor General), did not argue the military necessity point in the
case of The Paquete Habana. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES 26–27 (Nov. 30, 1900) (“The argument on behalf of the Government
undertook to show that, while by express allowance of the sovereign or executive in the past, small
fishing boats of the enemy near their own coasts were exempted on humane grounds and sometimes
because they supplied subsistence to the belligerent’s own vessels on blockade duty, larger vessels of
the types here involved ought not to be exempted, and were not in fact exempted under any wellestablished rule of international law, unless by express executive ordinance.”).
As for why the Assistant Attorney General did not argue the military necessity exception, it is
worth noting that the law of war was still very much underdeveloped. Law of war as it is known
today—which is a body of multilateral treaties establishing law-based norms for the conduct of
warfare—had begun to come into existence by 1898, but only barely. The “Lieber Code” of 1863 only
concerned land warfare and was only a General Order applicable to the Union Army, not a source of
international law. DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 9, at iii. It is remarkable that
only months after the captures of the Paquete Habana and the Lola, Secretary Long issued a General
Order similar to the Lieber Code, The Laws and Usages of War at Sea. Id.; John D. Long, Secretary of the
Navy, General Order No. 551, The Laws and Usages of War at Sea, Jun. 27, 1900, reprinted as Appendix I in
U.S. Naval War College, International Law Discussions, 1903: The United States Naval War Code of 1900,
at 101 (1904). Of particular relevance are Articles 3 and 11. Article 3 says: “Military necessity permits
measures that are indispensable for securing the ends of the war and that are in accordance with
modern laws and usages of war.” Id. at 103. Article 11 states: “The personnel of a merchant vessel of
an enemy captured as a prize can be held, at the discretion of the captor, as witnesses, or as prisoners
of war when by training or enrollment they are immediately available for the naval service of the
enemy.” Id. at 105. Still, this General Order came into force only after the captures.
As for international law, after the 1856 Paris Declaration Respecting Maritime Law, law of war at
sea did not again become the subject of multilateral treaty law until the First Hague Peace Conference
of 1899, which resulted in, among other things, the Hague Convention on Maritime Warfare. Treaties,
States Parties and Commentaries, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, https://ihl-databases.icrc.
org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesHistoricalByDate.xsp [https://perma.cc/Z6XR-B8J4]. Thus, the
case of the Paquete Habana fell within a law-of-war gap, so to say. There seems to have also been an
ever-present consideration of humanity, starting from the press reports (many of them accurate, some
wildly overblown) on the atrocities of the Spanish toward the Cubans. See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER,
JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 103 (5th ed.
2015) (explaining that the American military intervention was a response to Spanish brutality, among
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ascertained the military necessity exception, yet failed to apply the
exception.44 Rather than explain its rationale, the Court only mentioned in
passing that there was no evidence supporting the application of the
exception.45 On this premise, the Court inferred that the Admiral had
violated higher orders.46 The Court’s rationale reveals the error.
2.

The Rationale and the Error

The Court erroneously inferred that the Admiral violated the orders of
the Secretary of the Navy.47 On 25 April 1898—the day Congress declared
war with Spain, five days after the authorization for the use of force and
three days after the blockade order—the North Atlantic Squadron captured
the first ship, the Paquete Habana, sailing under the Spanish flag on course to
Havana, Cuba.48 Two days later, 27 April, the squadron captured the
second ship, the Lola, also sailing towards Havana under the Spanish flag.49
other reasons). In addition to Mr. Hoyt’s note that the customary exemption was on humane grounds,
a contemporary also made the same observation (and in the same volume of the same journal). Charles
Noble Gregory, The Law of Blockade, 12 YALE L.J. 339, 346 (1903) (“An interesting and humane
exception has been recently allowed by our own highest court in the case of fishing boats.”).
44. This is another factor that makes Little v. Barreme inapposite. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. 170
(1804). In Little, a prize case, the Supreme Court said, “the [President’s] instructions cannot change
the nature of the transaction, or legalize an act which without those instructions would have been a
plain trespass.” Id. at 179. In contrast, in the Paquete Habana, the President’s instructions were in
compliance with the law of nations, and the Court said so itself. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 712
(“The position taken by the United States during the recent war with Spain was quite in accord with
the rule of international law, now generally recognized by civilized nations, in regard to coast fishing
vessels.”). There are other facts that are important. For example, Little concerned the “undeclared,
Quasi War” with France. See, e.g., J. Gregory Sidak, The Quasi War Cases—and Their Relevance to Whether
“Letters of Marque and Reprisal” Constrain Presidential War Powers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 468
(2005) (concerning “the right of a sovereign nation to make decisions regarding” the waging of war).
The Spanish-American War was a declared war, a factor that makes the campaign more a matter of
political discretion. Also, in Little, it was not disputed that the vessel captured was in fact a neutral
vessel. Little, 6 U.S. at 178–79.
45. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 713–14.
46. As law scholar Michael Glennon has noted: “A close reading of The Paquete Habana reveals
that the Court invalidated acts of lower-level executive officials, not those of the President, because
the acts violated the President’s orders.” MICHAEL J. GLENNON, CONSTITUTIONAL DIPLOMACY 244
(1990).
47. Admiral Chadwick has also made the point: “In accord with the navy department’s
instructions, which would seem sufficiently explicit, a number of these vessels were sent into
Key West.” CHADWICK, supra note 22, at 146 n.1.
48. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 713. A packet is “a passenger boat usually carrying mail and
cargo.” Packet, Merriam-Webster Dictionary, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/packet
[https://perma.cc/TZX6-PHFV].
49. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 714.
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The next day, 28 April, Admiral Sampson telegraphed Secretary Long:
I find that a large number of fishing schooners are attempting to get into
Havana from their fishing grounds near the Florida reefs and coasts. They
are generally manned by excellent seamen, belonging to the maritime
inscription of Spain, who have already served in the Spanish navy, and who
are liable to further service. As these trained men are naval reserves, have a
semi-military character, and would be most valuable to the Spaniards as
artillerymen, either afloat or ashore, I recommend that they should be
detained prisoners of war, and that I should be authorized to deliver them to
the commanding officer of the army at Key West.50

On 30 April Secretary Long responded: “Spanish fishing vessels
attempting to violate blockade are subject, with crew, to capture, and any
such vessel or crew considered likely to aid [the] enemy may be detained.”51
In interpreting these correspondences, here is what the Court had to say:
The Admiral’s despatch assumed that he was not authorized, without express
order, to arrest coast fishermen peaceably pursuing their calling; and the
necessary implication and evident intent of the response of the Navy
Department were that Spanish coast fishing vessels and their crews should
not be interfered with, so long as they neither attempted to violate the
blockade, nor were considered likely to aid the enemy.52

This passage reveals the Court’s error. Contrary to the Court’s assertions,
the Admiral knew that the fishermen who might be of use to the Spanish
navy were not ordinary fishermen to whom the rule of exemption applied
in the absolute, and the Secretary authorized the captures if the Admiral
deemed the men likely to aid the enemy.53
This point is supported by the history that followed. In The Relations of
the United States and Spain: The Spanish American War, published in 1911,
retired Rear Admiral French Ensor Chadwick (who was also a veteran of
the War and had served with Admiral Sampson) said: “Several fishingschooners were released after their cargoes were thrown overboard, but the
admiral, in doubt as to the propriety of such release, telegraphed to the navy

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 712–13.
Id. at 713.
Id.
Id. at 712–13.
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department . . . . His suggestions were approved by a telegram from the
navy department, dated April 30, but not received until May 2.”54
However, as the Court continued:
[The Paquete Habana] had no arms or ammunition on board; she had no
knowledge of the blockade, or even of the war, until she was stopped by a
blockading vessel; she made no attempt to run the blockade, and no resistance
at the time of the capture; nor was there any evidence whatever of likelihood
that she or her crew would aid the enemy.55

This passage reveals the Court misconstrued Admiral Sampson’s telegram
and the Secretary’s response.56
54. See CHADWICK, supra note 22, at 146 (detailing the prevention of further supplies from
reaching forces is necessary to the scheme of blockade).
55. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 713–14.
56. Admiral Chadwick expressed astonishment with the result: “The final outcome of this
action,” referring to the Supreme Court’s decision, “was of an extraordinary character.” CHADWICK,
supra note 22, at 146 n.1. He continued:
While the present writer has the utmost respect for the ability and learning of this eminent judge,
he cannot think his treatment of this case wholly logical. . . . The Havana vessels were furnishing
food to a beleaguered army; beleaguered by sea by the fleet, practically by land by the insurgents,
to the extent at least that food was not obtainable from the surrounding country. Their only ports
were those so blockaded. The cutting off of the food supply of an enemy so situated has always
been recognized as a military duty and as an important element in the reduction of a fortress.
This of itself demanded at least their detention. The fact that their crews were reservists of the
Spanish navy, trained men who undoubtedly would have been utilized in the Havana defence,
was an additional reason of equal or perhaps greater weight. . . . [A]s the case stood, the fishingvessels seized and condemned were intending to violate a blockade and carry food to a besieged
enemy.
Id. at 147 n.1. One scholar (who now happens to be the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals for the
Armed Forces) has noted Admiral Chadwick’s observations as “dubious.” Scott W. Stucky, The
Paquete Habana: A Case History in the Development of International Law, 15 UNIV. BALT. L. REV. 1, 20
(1985). Chief Judge Stucky was gracious enough to engage with the author on this point in a series of
emails between 12 August and 15 September 2020]. After all, the ships did not have a Spanish
commission, and none of the crewman knew anything about the war or the blockade. Scott W. Stucky,
The Paquete Habana: A Case History in the Development of International Law, 15 UNIV. BALT. L. REV. 1,
14–15 (1985). However, some news reports from 1898 lend credibility to Admiral Chadwick’s
observations, at least with respect to the crewmen being reservists in the Spanish navy. For example,
after publishing the report on the administration’s views concerning the President’s rules of
engagement on 26 April, the New York Times also published reports on several of the other captured
fishing boats. According to the report of the capture of the Engracia: “Only one blank shot was
necessary to bring her to. She had on board a crew of seven men and a cargo of fish. The men on
board the prize had been in the Spanish Navy, and served as a sort of naval reserve.” The Newport Takes
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It was not the Court’s province to weigh the propriety of the Admiral’s
determination that the crewmen were likely to aid the enemy. The justiciable
issue, properly framed, was whether the district court was wrong to have
condemned the captured ships as lawful prizes.57 The district court’s
condemnation of the ships under prize law was subject to judicial review.
However, the ships’ capture was attendant to the crewmen’s capture as
suspected reservists of the Spanish navy, and so was not subject to judicial
review.58 The heart of the error was the Court’s inference that Admiral
Sampson’s capture of the ships was contrary to higher orders and violated
the customary norm.59
Three justices dissented, and, on the issue of discretion, the dissenters
had it right. Chief Justice Melville Fuller—together with Associate Justices
John Harlan and Joseph McKenna—conceded, “I am unable to conclude
that there is any such established international rule, or that this court can
properly revise action which must be treated as having been taken in the
ordinary exercise of discretion in the conduct of war.”60
Regarding when the Admiral dispatched the Secretary, the dissenters
continued on this point: “Of course they would be liable to be if involved
in the guilt of blockade running, and the Secretary agreed that they might be
[if likely to aid the enemy] in the Admiral’s discretion. All this was in
accordance with the rules and usages of international law.”61

a Sloop, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1898, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1898/05/
01/102071761.html [https://perma.cc/A2NT-Q626]. There was also the issue of impressment, which
is “the state authority to require the service of a subject for the defence of the country.” THE OXFORD
COMPANION TO SHIPS AND THE SEA 415 (Peter Kemp ed., 1988) (1976) (“Impressment was a general
and recognized method of recruitment in most countries of the world, and applied equally to service
ashore and afloat.”). With the blockade cutting off Spain’s ability to send men to reinforce its army
and navy, it had little choice but to impress seafaring Cuban merchantmen into military and naval
service. This fact had shaped the state of affairs for Admiral Sampson and the North Atlantic
Squadron. For example, as reported in the New York Times on 1 May 1898: “The captain of the Lola
hove to when a blank shot was put across his bows, declaring that he would rather be captured by the
Americans than enter [General] Blanco’s service, which he would be compelled to do if he went into
Havana.” Fishing Smack Lola Taken, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1898, https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/
timesmachine/1898/05/01/102071761.html [https://perma.cc/DBC2-69YD]. It was after the
capture of the Lola that Admiral Sampson telegraphed Secretary Long.
57. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 678.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 715 (Fuller, J., dissenting).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 717.
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All this follows from the opinion’s details. However, there are facts not
recited that are also important. These facts also show that the Admiral
followed the President’s orders.
B. The President’s Rules of Engagement
According to the joint resolution authorizing military force, a state of war
had existed since 21 April.62 On 26 April, President McKinley, through the
Secretary of State and Secretary Long, communicated this authorization to
Admiral Sampson.63 The President’s letter also established certain rules of
engagement, which reproduced the provisions of the 1856 Paris Declaration
Respecting Maritime Law, a law of war treaty.64 The President also directed
that the war was to be “conducted upon principles in harmony with the
present views of nations & sanctioned by their recent practice.”65
The rules of engagement also said that, notwithstanding the blockade,
under certain conditions, Spanish merchant vessels should be allowed to
pass until 21 May,
provided that nothing here in contained shall apply to Spanish vessels having
on board any officer in the military or naval service of the enemy or any coal
except such as may be necessary for their voyage; or any other articles
prohibited of contraband of war or any dispatch of or to the Spanish
[Government].66

62. Id. at 712.
63. Id.
64. See DEP’T OF DEF., LAW OF WAR MANUAL, supra note 9, at 1157 (“The United States [was]
not a Party to the 1856 Paris Declaration.”). For a brief overview of the state of the law of war in 1898,
see supra note 43.
65. Telegraph from John D. Long, Sec’y of the Navy, to William T. Sampson, Rear Admiral,
U.S. Navy, Commander of the N. Atl. Squadron (Apr. 26, 1898), https://www.history.navy.mil/
research/publications/documentary-histories/united-states-navy-s/blockade-of-northern/secretaryof-the-nav.html [https://perma.cc/A43V-KG5W].
66. Id.; see William T. Sampson, Instructions to Blockading Vessels and Cruisers (May 5, 1898)
(unpublished military instructions), http://hrnm.navy.mil/research/publications/documentaryhistories/united-states-navy-s/naval-operations-in/instructions-to-bloc.html [https://perma.cc/8A
JF-7EDM] [hereinafter Sampson, Instructions to Blockading] (incorporating Admiral Sampson’s
instructions by reference).
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More than that, Navy regulations passed in 1862 had made the violation
or disobedience of orders, or the carrying out of orders with negligence or
carelessness, punishable by court-martial.67 These regulations, The Articles
for the Government of the Navy, set out several constraints on prize captures and
remained in force throughout the war.68
Between 22 and 26 April, and notwithstanding the 30-day grace period,
the North Atlantic Squadron captured and sent for adjudication four
Spanish ships, documented as “unarmed steamers.”69 Some were merchant
ships,70 and the President was “[n]ot [p]leased with the [c]apture of
[m]erchantmen,” such captures appearing to be against the orders of
26 April.71 The next day, the New York Times published a report to that
effect.72
Still, those rules of engagement did not cover captures made before the
President’s order. The Administration expressed its view that the propriety
of such seizures should be left to prize courts:
[C]aptures made before the proclamation must be judged according to the
general principles of international law, which do not preclude such captures. Each

67. Act of Jul. 17, 1862, ch. CCIV, § 1, art. 1, 12 Stat. 608 (1862); see also Wright, supra note 43,
at 259 (“Military and naval regulations and instructions are enforced by courts martial whose
jurisdiction, however, is largely confined to the statutory articles of war, and by military commissions.”).
68. Act of Jul. 17, 1862, ch. CCIV, § 1, art. 1, 12 Stat. 608.
69. Spanish Ships and Commanders, NAVAL HIST. & HERITAGE COMMAND, https://www.history.
navy.mil/research/publications/documentary-histories/united-states-navy-s/list-ships-commanders/
spanish-ships-and-commanders.html [https://perma.cc/89WW-TK3T].
70. The ships were the Argonauta, Buena Ventura, Catalina, and the Miguel Jover. The Argonauta
was a mail steamer laden with “general merchandise, with a large quantity of arms and ammunition
intended for the Spanish troops in Cuba.” The Argonauta at Key West, N.Y. TIMES, May 4, 1898,
https://www.nytimes.com/1898/05/04/archives/the-argonauta-at-key-west-col-de-cortijo-weylersbrotherinlaw-on.html. The Buena Ventura, laden with lumber, was determined to be a good prize, but
the Supreme Court reversed the decision. The Buena Ventura, 175 U.S. 384, 391, (1899). The Miguel
Jover and the Catalina, both laden with cotton, were released. CHADWICK, supra note 22, at 132–34.
71. President and the Prizes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1898, https://www.nytimes.com/1898/04/27/
archives/president-and-the-prizes-his-proclamation-not-retroactive-mr.html.
72. Id. (“The proclamation does not make any specific reference to ships taken prior to its
promulgation [on April 26]. In some quarters it has been assumed that it was intended to be operative
from the day the war began, which is officially set down as April 21. Under this interpretation the
vessels taken in Cuban waters up to date would be exempt from capture, and would have to be returned
to their owners, with consequent loss of prize money to their captors. This, however, is not the view
taken by the Administration.”).
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case will go before the prize court . . . and be adjudicated upon its merits
according to the well[-]defined rules and regulations of the laws of nations.73

Now, remember the squadron had captured the Paquete Habana on the
25th and the Lola on the 27th.74 The Secretary’s dispatch on the 26th
communicated the Administration’s intent to allow the passage of merchant
ships as exempt from prize capture, with the exception that those likely to
the aid the enemy were to be detained.75 Admiral Sampson’s telegram on
the 28th described the special character of the crewmen—being such as to
put them in the exception to the President’s directive—expecting more
ships with men of similar character and requested authorization to take them
as prisoners.76 The Secretary’s response on 30 April left to the Admiral’s
judgment whether the men were likely to aid the enemy.77 In exercising
that judgment, the Admiral’s actions complied with the President’s orders
and the rules of engagement.78
After the Secretary’s dispatch of 30 April stating “any such vessel or crew
[considered] likely to aid the enemy may be detained,” which Admiral
Sampson received on 2 May, the Admiral issued rules of engagement of his
own.79
C. The Admiral’s Rules of Engagement
On 5 May the Admiral published an order to his men: “The vessels of
this Squadron while engaged in blockading and cruising service, will be
governed by the rules of International law and the decisions of Prize
73. Id. (emphasis added) (“The information comes from thoroughly trustworthy sources that
the President and his Cabinet have viewed the prize-taking performances of the fleet off Havana with
anything but enthusiasm. The President is understood to be inclined to view these as unworthy [of]
the dignity of American war ships, and to regret them as tending to put this country in a bad light
before the world. The suggestion has been made that, regarding the seizure of these ships in the light
of misfortunes as he does, the President might take upon himself to order their release. He has the
power to do this before the cases are adjudicated in the prize court, and there is no doubt that he would
exercise it were it not that such action might be taken by the officers of the fleet as a rebuke to their
zeal, the good intentions of which are not doubted.”).
74. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 713–14 (1900).
75. President and the Prizes, supra note 71.
76. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 712–13.
77. Id. at 713.
78. As were the prize captures. Consider what the Supreme Court said only a few years later,
that, in the case of the Paquete Habana, the Lola, and the other similar vessels, “The libels alleged a
capture pursuant to instructions from the President.” United States v. Paquete Habana (The Paquete
Habana II), 189 U.S. 453, 465 (1903).
79. CHADWICK, supra note 22, at 146.
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courts.”80 Far from leaving the men to educate themselves on the rules, the
Admiral set out in writing the most salient provisions—twenty-eight in total,
of almost 2,000 words.81 Most important among them was this: “A neutral
vessel carrying troops or military personages of the enemy is liable to
seizure.”82
Notice the reference to neutral vessels.83 If neutral vessels “carrying
troops or military personages of the enemy” were liable to capture, also
liable to capture were enemy vessels, and the Paquete Habana, the Lola, and
the other similar vessels were all flying the Spanish flag.84
Admiral Sampson stopped and searched the two vessels to enforce the
order of blockade, following the authorization for the use of military force,
presidential directive, rules of engagement, and international law.85 When
the Admiral discovered that the men were likely reservists of the Spanish
Navy, he took them prisoner, as they were men of the character that the
President specifically noted as those who were to be captured. Still, the
Admiral sought guidance for good measure.86
After the Admiral’s squadron interdicted the ships and the Admiral sent
the detained crewmen to the army base at Key West, the matter was out of
his hands, and the condemnation of the ships as prizes was completely
separate.87 The instructions he published to his men suggest the Admiral
had not acted contrary to his interpretation of Secretary Long’s dispatch but
following it—it being consistent with the applicable law of nations and with
the intent of the Commander-in-Chief.88
All this is not to mention the North Atlantic Squadron ships, between the
2nd and the 9th of May, captured at least eight other fishing boats, three
after Admiral Sampson’s receipt of the President’s rules of engagement, and
80. Instructions to Blockading, supra note 66. The Admiral also reproduced the President’s rules of
engagement, its provisions to be incorporated by reference. According to Admiral Chadwick’s first
volume, Admiral Sampson’s rules of engagement, Instructions to Blockading Vessels and Cruisers, were “but
slightly modified” by the State Department. CHADWICK, supra note 22, at 145.
81. Instructions to Blockading, supra note 66.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. “The flag or pass under which a ship is sailed is deemed conclusive evidence of its national
character, though in general, the national character of a vessel depends on the domicil of the owner.”
UPTON, supra note 32, at 410.
85. Instructions to Blockading, supra note 66.
86. Id.
87. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 651 (1863).
88. Jurisdiction: Admiralty and Maritime, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/
jurisdiction-admiralty-and-maritime [https://perma.cc/Z6SP-L2DY].
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five after the Admiral’s own rules of engagement.89 No telegram came to
admonish the squadron or prevent any further captures.90
So while a close reading of the Paquete Habana reveals that the Court
invalidated acts of lower-level executive branch officials, not those of the
President, the facts and circumstances attendant to the seizures that the
Court overlooked (and a natural reading of the Paquete Habana II) reveal that
this invalidation was in error.91
The Court decided the case in 1900, yet the Paquete Habana error had its
origins in 1803, in the origins of the doctrine of political questions.
III. EXPLAINING THE ERROR
“[W]here there is no treaty, and no controlling [e]xecutive or legislative
act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of
civilized nations,”92 so went the Court’s reasoning, “and, as evidence of
these, to the works of jurists and commentators . . . . not for the
speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for
trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.”93 Yet the federal courts’
authority to say what the law is came from a source that also put profound
constraints on that authority, constraints the Court ignored.94 The Supreme

89. Paco (captured by Newport on 2 May); Oriente and Suarez (captured by Helena and
Montgomery respectively on 5 May); Espana and Padre de Dios (both captured by Newport on 7 May);
Santiago Apostal (captured by Mayflower on 8 May); Fernandito and Severito (captured by Vicksburg and
Dolphin respectively on 9 May). Spanish Vessels Captured up to Evening of May 19, N.Y. TRIBUNE, May 21,
1898, at 3, https://www.newspapers.com/image/468657509/. The Supreme Court in 1903 listed
these ships as “fishing smacks, which were libeled as prize of war,” and, “[t]he proceedings in all the
cases are similar and the evidence, to a large extent, the same” as the Paquete Habana and the Lola.
United States v. Paquete Habana (The Paquete Habana II), 189 U.S. 453, 463–64 (1903). The Dolphin,
Newport, Helena, Montgomery, Mayflower, and Vicksburg were ships of the North Atlantic Squandron under
the command of Admiral Sampson. CHADWICK, supra note 22, at 399–400.
90. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 712–13 (1900).
91. See generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677; The Paquete Habana II, 189 U.S. 453.
92. LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 240 (2d ed. 1996).
93. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700. See generally HENKIN, supra note 92, at 241 (“[I]t is not
clear that the Court’s incidental qualification was addressing the significance of a public act that was
inconsistent with the international principle. In context, the Court was telling the courts how they
should determine whether a particular rule has become a principle of international law. The Court said
that one has to explore the practice of states and distill a principle from that practice, unless a public
act by some branch of the U.S. government has already determined and codified the principle on behalf
of the United States. By this reading, the Court’s statement did not address at all whether the Executive
(or Congress) is free to act contrary to international law.”)
94. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (giving the courts authority to interpret the law)
(explaining the federal courts have the authority to interpret appropriate laws).
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Court had applied the political question doctrine to political discretion
matters since the inception of judicial review.95
The Constitution of the United States divides foreign relations powers
between Congress and the President, and this division is most profound for
war powers. Article I gives Congress the power “To declare War,” “To raise
and support Armies,” “To provide and maintain a Navy,” and “To make
Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.”96
There are also, of course, the Necessary and Proper Clause97 and the
Appropriations Clause.98 Article II makes the President the Chief
Executive99 and “Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual
Service of the United States.”100 The framework is also important.101
War powers include—as two realms of international law—treaties and
the “law of nations.”102 What was once the law of nations in the parlance
95. Id. at 170 (explaining the courts decide the rights of individuals, not “how the executive, or
executive officers, perform duties in which they have a discretion”).
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11–14.
97. Id. cl. 18. Congress relied on the Necessary & Proper Clause when it passed the War Powers
Resolution of 1973. See 50 U.S.C. § 1541(b) (“Under article I, section 8, of the Constitution, it is
specifically provided that the Congress shall have the power to make all laws necessary and proper for
carrying into execution, not only its own powers but also all other powers vested by the Constitution
in the Government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.”).
98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 12; Id. § 9, cl. 7.
99. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
100. Id. § 2, cl. 1.
101. HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER
AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 68 (1990).
102. In addition to the Declare War Clause, Article I, Section 8, of the Constitution of the
United States says in pertinent part: “The Congress shall have Power . . . To define and punish . . .
Offences against the Law of Nations.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10. Article II, Section 2, says the
President “shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties,
provided two thirds of the Senators present concur.” Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. As for the judicial power,
Article III says: “The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their
Authority; . . . to all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; [and] to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party.” Id. art. III, § 2. On treaties and the law of nations, see John Jay, Federalist
Papers: Primary Documents in American History; The Federalist No. 3, LIBR. OF CONG.,
https://guides.loc.gov/federalist-papers/text-1-10#s-lg-box-wrapper-25493266 [https://perma.cc/
5G3F-85BB] (“The [just] causes of war, for the most part, arise either from violation of treaties or
from direct violence. America has already formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations . . . . It
is of high importance to the peace of America that she observe the laws of nations towards all these
powers.”). In 1793, Jay had more to say on treaties and the law of nations: “Treaties between
independent nations, are contracts or bargains which derive all their force and obligation from mutual
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of the Revolution is now customary international law.103 International law
comprises maritime law, which in turn includes prize law, decided in courts
of admiralty.104 Under Article III of the Constitution, which gives the
United States’ judicial power to the federal courts, the Judiciary Act of 1789
gave jurisdiction on all admiralty and maritime cases to the district courts.105
The law of 1891, building on this framework, also gave the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction over prize cases, direct from the districts.106
With this background in mind, it is hard to overstate that the
Supreme Court in the Paquete Habana was sitting as a prize court, not a court
of general jurisdiction.107 It had cognizance only over matters of
prize.108 What follows is that the Paquete Habana holding is limited to prize
cases, and though the case might persuade, it should not serve as precedent
for non-prize cases. The holding of the Paquete Habana was that the ships
consent and agreement . . . As to the laws of nations—they are those laws by which nations are bound
to regulate their conduct towards each other, both in peace and war.” Grand Jury Charge of 1793,
reproduced in Henfield’s Case, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1100 (Cir. C. Pa. 1793) (No. 6360).
103. Customary international law is “a type of unwritten law grounded in the ‘practice of
states.’” JAMES R. HOLMES, A BRIEF GUIDE TO MARITIME STRATEGY 7 (2019) (“Customary
international law exists alongside treaty law, much as common law coexists with written laws in many
domestic legal systems. In other words, what states do—their observable behavior—indicates what
they believe international law and norms to be.”). James R. Holmes is a naval strategist and current J.
C. Wylie Chair of Maritime Strategy at the Naval War College. James R. Holmes, Ph.D., U.S. NAVAL
WAR COLL., https://usnwc.edu/Faculty-and-Departments/Directory/James-R-Holmes [https://
perma.cc/GGR5-GWUZ].
104. Jurisdiction: Admiralty and Maritime, supra note 88.
105. In 1789, Congress passed the Judiciary Act. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73. The
Act established, specifically, the federal districts: “Each district was generally coextensive with a state;
each had a federal district court and a district judge. The districts, in turn, were grouped into three
circuits. In each circuit, a circuit court, made up of two Supreme Court Justices and one district judge,
sat twice a year.” LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 94 (Oxford Univ. Press
4d ed. 2019) (1973). Thus, as legal scholar Joseph Sweeney has explained: “In 1789, the federal courts,
sitting as prize courts, were vested with exclusive jurisdiction, as against the state courts, to decide the
legality of a capture as prize and any issue incidental to the capture, such as a claim for reparation of a
tort committed by the captors.” Joseph Modeste Sweeney, A Tort Only in Violation of the Law of Nations,
18 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 445, 447 (1995).
106. Jurisdiction: Appellate, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/courts/jurisdictionappellate [https://perma.cc/WCB2-WRJ2].
107. See Sweeney, supra note 105, at 483 (“The Supreme Court of the United States was sitting
in the case as a court of prize. In so doing, it remained, of course, a court of the United States, but it
was not sitting as such. In the famous words of Lord Stowell, it was sitting as ‘a Court of the Law of
Nations.’”).
108. “The prize jurisdiction of a court of admiralty, is that which authorizes it to take cognizance
of captures made on the sea . . . for the purpose of determining whether the property captured or
surrendered, is or is not lawful prize of war.” UPTON, supra note 32, at 388.
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and their cargos were not lawful prizes, a very narrow holding.109
Therefore, it is an error to think of it as an abrogation of the political
question doctrine as applied to matters of wartime military discretion or
Commander-in-Chief discretion.
Let us examine the doctrine.
A. Judicial Review and Political Questions
Article III of the Constitution says the United States’ judicial power shall
extend to cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States
and controversies to which the United States is a party.110 However, the
Constitution does not say the judicial power includes the authority “to say
what the law is.”111 The federal courts’ authority “to say what the law is”
comes from Marbury v. Madison,112 which also established the doctrine of
political questions.113 The political question doctrine established that
matters of political discretion are not subject to judicial review.114
In Marbury, Chief Justice John Marshall famously announced: “It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity
expound and interpret that rule.”115 However, as Chief Justice Marshall
also emphasized,
By the [C]onstitution of the United States, the President is invested with
certain important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his
own discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political
character, and to his own conscience. To aid him in the performance of these
duties, he is authorized to appoint certain officers, who act by his authority
and in conformity with his orders.
In such cases, their acts are his acts; and whatever opinion may be
entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be used, still
there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects

109. See generally The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677(1900).
110. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
111. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 170 (describing how the courts decide the rights of individuals, not how the executive
and his officers perform their duties in which they have discretion).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 177.
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are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights, and being
entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive.116

As Chief Justice Marshall continued,
The province of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals, not
to enquire how the executive, or executive officers, perform duties in which
they have a discretion. Questions, in their nature political, or which are, by
the [C]onstitution and laws, submitted to the executive, can never be made in
this court.117

That is, there are questions that may be presented to a court of law but
that a court of law may not decide—which is to say they are nonjusticiable—
because they are political in nature, or are, by the Constitution and laws,
“submitted” to the executive.118 This principle constitutes the first
formulation of the political question doctrine.119
Now, it is true that “Nothing in this general formulation implied that
presidential initiatives over the war power fell outside the scope of judicial
review.”120 However, it is also true that nothing in the general formulation
of judicial review over the war power had implied that judicial review should
operate to call into question matters of wartime military discretion or
Commander-in-Chief discretion.121 In fact, Supreme Court cases had
expressly applied the political question doctrine to bar such matters from
judicial review.122
B. Wartime Actions and Political Discretion
By the time of the Paquete Habana, the Supreme Court had explained war
measures were not subject to judicial review.123 Consider what the
Supreme Court had to say in the Prize Cases:124

116. Id. at 165–66.
117. Id. at 170.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 165–66.
120. Louis Fisher, Judicial Review of the War Power, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 466, 468 (2005)
(discussing how at the time of Marbury, the decision to wage war was with the legislative branch, not
the president).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 651 (1863).
124. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
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Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander-in-chief, in
suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed hostile resistance, and
a civil war of such alarming proportions as will compel him to accord to them
the character of belligerents, is a question to be decided by him, and this Court
must be governed by the decisions and acts of the political department of the
Government to which this power was entrusted. . . . The proclamation of
blockade is itself official and conclusive evidence to the Court that a state of
war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a measure,
under the circumstances peculiar to the case.125

To be sure, the facts of the Prize Cases make the opinion inapposite to the
Paquete Habana.126 Notwithstanding, the dicta expressed in the Prize Cases
and others had begun to shape the political questions doctrine by the time
of the Spanish American War.127
By the joint resolution of 20 April 1898, Congress authorized military
force to liberate Cuba.128 On 21 April, President McKinley ordered
Admiral Sampson to blockade Cuba along its northern coast and interdict
Spanish ships.129 When Congress declared war on 25 April, it expressly
recognized that a state of war had existed since the 21st.130

125. See id. at 670 (finding the political branches are enabled to “prosecute war with vigor and
efficiency”) (emphasis omitted).
126. See ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 191(2004).
127. On the point of matters of Commander-in-Chief discretion as not subject to judicial
review, also consider the case of Durand v. Hollins, 8 F. Cas. 111 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860) (No. 4186)
(“The question whether it was the duty of the president to interpose for the protection of the citizens
at Greytown [in Nicaragua] . . . was a public political question, in which the government, as well as the
citizens whose interests were involved, was concerned, and which belonged to the executive to
determine; and his decision is final and conclusive, and justified the defendant in the execution of his
orders given through the secretary of the navy.”). Id. at 112. Durand, a case from the Circuit Court of
the Southern District of New York, is not a part of the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence. Still, it was an
early case that shaped the application of the doctrine in matters of Commander-in-Chief discretion.
Of note, the author of the opinion in Durand, Samuel Nelson, was an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court serving on the circuit court, as was then customary. See SCHLESINGER JR., supra note 126, at 191
(discussing Samuel Nelson’s service on the Supreme Court). Since, like the Paquete Habana, Durand has
remained a staple of the law concerning war powers, especially within the executive branch. See JACK
L. GOLDSMITH III, DEPLOYMENT OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES TO HAITI: MEMORANDUM
OPINION FOR THE COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT 2 (Mar. 17, 2004), https://fas.org/irp/
agency/doj/olc/haiti.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZZ9Q-YCDD] (citing Durand for support).
128. Act of Apr. 20, 1898, Pub. L. No. 55-24, 30 Stat. 738 (recognizing the independence of the
people of Cuba by joint resolution).
129. The Sinking of Maine, supra note 17.
130. Id.
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As for the rule, when the Court said, “where there is no treaty and no
controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be
had to the customs and usages of civilized nations,” it said nothing
offensive.131 But it misapplied its own rule.132 There was a controlling
executive act that ordered the blockade and directed the capture of all
Spanish ships and even neutral ships with men likely to aid the enemy.
There were controlling legislative acts that authorized the use of military
force and declared war, a declaration that Congress made retroactive to the
blockade’s date and, therefore, ratified the President’s measures undertaken
to effectuate the blockade.133 And there were judicial decisions, not least
Marbury but also the Prize Cases, establishing political discretion decisions to
be barred from judicial review.134
Admiral Sampson’s captures of the two fishing boats were actions
extending from the Commander-in-Chief’s wartime military discretion and
were therefore not subject to judicial review.135
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND WAR POWERS
In time of war, the law is silent.136 This maxim, attributed to Cicero, could
just as well be imputed to Clausewitz or others on war. It, too,
oversimplifies. Law does apply to conduct in wartime.137 But more
difficult is the answer to the question of which law applies. Perhaps the
better principle is, in time of war, the law defers.138 In matters of warfare, the
political question doctrine is a doctrine not of silence but deference,
deference to Commander-in-Chief discretion, and the law of war.139
131. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
132. President McKinley’s Proclamation of Blockade to Forsyth, supra note 24.
133. The Sinking of Maine, supra note 17.
134. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 170 (1803); The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635 (1863).
135. President McKinley’s Proclamation of Blockade to Forsyth, supra note 24.
136. STEPHEN BREYER, THE COURT AND THE WORLD: AMERICAN LAW AND THE NEW
GLOBAL REALITIES 15 (2015).
137. Id. at 19.
138. See id. (“[I]n certain instances, the Constitution gives not to the courts but to other branches
of government the power to decide whether an action violates the Constitution. In this way, the laws,
including the Constitution, do not necessarily fall ‘silent.’ They still apply to the government action in
question. But it is for Congress or the President, not the courts, to determine what the law requires
given the national security threat.”).
139. The political question doctrine is “more specific and better developed than Cicero’s maxim
as crisis jurisprudence,” though in some cases, “as applied to questions of national security, it is
nonetheless in the same spirit.” See id. (“[B]y walling off many of the President’s wartime and foreign
affairs decisions from review, it is but one step removed from Cicero.”).
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Events in the first half of the twentieth century further complicated
judicial review. In the famous words of scholar Edward Corwin, the
Constitution had proved to be “an invitation to struggle for the privilege of
directing American foreign policy”140 with the Supreme Court as the final
arbiter of the law of foreign relations. What has emerged is that
Commander-in-Chief discretion is not absolute, as the Supreme Court
intimated in Curtiss-Wright.141 Although the Court in Curtiss-Wight did not
use the phrase political question, the rationale reveals application of the
doctrine.142 The same is true for the cases concerning the United States’
internment of Japanese-Americans and Youngstown.143
The Japanese-American internment cases are important because they
exemplify the struggle for control expressed in Corwin’s aphorism, and
precisely in the area of Commander-in-Chief wartime military discretion.
Youngstown is important because it stands out as an example of the federal
judiciary asserting itself against executive overreach, and again in a matter of
Commander-in-Chief wartime military discretion.144
To be sure, much went wrong in the Japanese Internment cases.145 Still,
Associate Justice Robert Jackson’s statement in dissent in Korematsu146 is
unassailable: “In the very nature of things[,] military decisions are not
140. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICES AND POWERS 1787–1957, at 171 (N.Y.
Univ. Press 4th ed. 1957) (1940).
141. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936) (“It is
important to bear in mind that we are here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President
by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority plus the very delicate, plenary and
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of international
relations . . . .”). This extraneous treatment came to stand for a “vision of unrestrained executive
discretion.” KOH, supra note 101, at 112.
142. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. at 329.
143. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (The Steel Seizure Case), 343 U.S. 579, 634
(1952) (discussing the “infirmity of confusing the issue of a power’s validity with the cause it is invoked
to promote,” in the context of Presidential powers); see BREYER, supra note 136, at 79 (“As to the
‘political question’ doctrine, as expressed in Curtiss-Wright and Korematsu, the Guantanamo cases did not
overrule these decisions directly, but it is as if they (and also Steel Seizure [Youngstown]) drained those
earlier cases of their persuasive force . . . .”).
144. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 585.
145. Neal Kumar Katyal, Trump v. Hawaii: How the Supreme Court Simultaneously Overturned and
Revived Korematsu, 128 YALE L.J.F. 641, 641–42 (2019) (“[T]he Court’s decision in Korematsu has joined
the ranks of this country’s most notorious antiprecedents—textbook cases of judicial decision-making
gone wrong that jurists of all stripes vow never to repeat.”); Neal Katyal, Confession of Error:
The Solicitor General’s Mistakes During the Japanese-American Internment Cases, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE
(May 20, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa/blog/confession-error-solicitor-generals-mistakesduring-japanese-american-internment-cases [https://perma.cc/TN9W-38BH].
146. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal . . . . Hence courts can never have
any real alternative to accepting the mere declaration of the authority that
issued the order that it was reasonably necessary from a military
viewpoint.”147 Another of Justice Jackson’s opinions, his concurring
opinion in Youngstown, is of paramount importance on judicial review of war
powers.148
A. Commander-in-Chief Discretion and the Twilight Zone
Youngstown came up during the Korean War.149 Steelworkers threatened
to strike after talks failed on new collective bargaining agreements.150
Fearing the impending strike would jeopardize the steel production needed
for the war, President Truman ordered the Secretary of Commerce to take
possession of the steel mills and oversee their operation.151 The workers
brought suit, arguing that the order was beyond the President’s power.152
The President invoked his authority as Chief Executive and Commanderin-Chief, characterizing the Korean campaign as a grave emergency that
necessitated the order.153
In the end, the Court held against the seizure.154 Justice Hugo Black
wrote the Court’s opinion.155 Four of the five justices who concurred with
Justice Black issued separate opinions, each important in its own right, but
none more important than Justice Jackson’s concurring opinion.156
In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson outlined a three-part
framework of presidential power:

147. Id. at 245.
148. With experience as Solicitor General, Attorney General, and Chief United States
Prosecutor on the Nuremburg Trials, it is not surprising that Justice Jackson had much to say on
judicial review of war powers. See About the Robert H. Jackson Center, ROBERT H. JACKSON CTR.,
https://www.roberthjackson.org/about/ [https://perma.cc/2AY8-UWDS] (detailing the positions
Justice Jackson held throughout his career).
149. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 582.
154. Id. at 589.
155. Id. at 582.
156. See BREYER, supra note 136, at 56 (“Justice Robert Jackson added what history has shown
to be the most important concurring opinion, in which he set forth an important, now well-known
analysis dividing presidential action into three categories.”).
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1. When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authorization
of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he
possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate. . . .
2. When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but
there is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concurrent
authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. . . .
3. When the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitutional powers of
Congress over the matter.157

In explaining the scope and limits of presidential power, Justice Jackson
sought to make clear the import of Curtiss-Wright, so as to refute any residual
ideas of its endorsement of “unrestrained executive discretion.”
Justice Jackson emphasized:
[Curtiss-Wright] recognized internal and external affairs as being in separate
categories, and held that the strict limitation upon congressional delegations
of power to the President over internal affairs does not apply with respect to
delegations of power in external affairs. It was intimated that the President
might act in external affairs without congressional authority, but not that he
might act contrary to an Act of Congress.158

Thus, it is important to keep in mind that the Japanese-American
internment cases and Youngstown concerned matters implicating the exercise
of war powers in internal affairs. Furthermore, even a cursory review of
Curtiss-Wright and Korematsu reveals that both cases concerned executive
function together with congressional approval, either beforehand or after
the fact.159 Yet when such authority is exercised abroad in wartime under
the Commander-in-Chief power, judicial review may be had, but only under
narrow circumstances, and for narrow purposes. Considering these
difficulties, what is necessary is a “discriminating analysis.”160

157. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–37.
158. Id. at 636 n.2.
159. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 215–16 (1944); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Exp. Co., 299 U.S. 304, 311 (1936).
160. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211–12 (1962).
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B. Foreign Relations and the Discriminating Analysis
The case of Baker v. Carr161 is the most important case in shaping the
political question doctrine, not least because it set out factors the Court
determined to be relevant in judging whether and to what extent to apply
it.162 After Baker, in foreign relations and national security cases, courts
must undertake the appropriate discriminating analysis of the particular
question posed.
Associate Justice William Brennan established the Baker framework, such
that:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is
found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to
a coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.163

Baker factors 1 and 2 have remained intact.164 These two criteria are still
very much a part of the analysis.165 Factors 3,166 4, 5, and 6 concern the
161. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
162. Id. at 211.
163. Id. at 217.
164. But see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–06 (1979) (laying out rationale on the nonjusticiability of political questions without any mention whatsoever of the Baker factors). In Goldwater,
none of the Justices was able to marshal enough support for his views to bring about a majority opinion.
Justices Stewart & Stevens joined Justice Rehnquist’s opinion, which then constituted the plurality
view. Id. at 1002.
165. See Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973) (“It would be difficult to think of a clearer
example of the type of governmental action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the
political branches directly responsible—as the Judicial Branch is not—to the electoral process.
Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less
competence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the composition, training,
equipping, and control of a military force are essentially professional military judgments, subject always
to civilian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.”) (emphasis in original); see also Nixon v.
United States, 506 U.S. 224, 236 (1993) (“In addition to the textual commitment argument, we are
persuaded that the lack of finality and the difficulty of fashioning relief counsel against justiciability.”).
166. Factor 3, the test of the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of
a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion, seems to suggest that the true nature of the test is whether the
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prudential features of the doctrine. Consider Justice Powell’s concurring
opinion in Goldwater v. Carter,167 which subsumed Baker’s last four factors
into the issue of whether “prudential considerations counsel against judicial
intervention.”168
As for foreign relations, Baker emphasized that “it is error to suppose that
every case or controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond
judicial cognizance.”169 The Court went on to say:
Our cases in this field seem invariably to show a discriminating analysis of the
particular question posed, in terms [1] of the history of its management by the
political branches, [2] of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the light of its
nature and posture in the specific case, and [3] of the possible consequences
of judicial action.170

These are the Baker principles.

issue is yet ripe for review. That is, if the issue is impossible to decide without an initial policy
determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion, then, in order for it to be possible for the
Court to decide the issue, there must first be some policy determination by one or the other of the
political branches. This sounds in the principle of ripeness. See Goldwater, 444 U.S. at 997 (Powell, J.,
concurring) (“This Court has recognized that an issue should not be decided if it is not ripe for judicial
review. Prudential considerations persuade me that a dispute between Congress and the President is
not ready for judicial review unless and until each branch has taken action asserting its constitutional
authority.”). Consider also this statement from Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s concurrence in Zivotofsky:
“[I]t may be appropriate for courts to stay their hand in cases implicating delicate questions concerning
the distribution of political authority between coordinate branches until a dispute is ripe, intractable,
and incapable of resolution by the political process.” Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 206 (2012)
(Sotomayor, J., concurring).
167. Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979).
168. Id. at 998.
169. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
170. Id. at 211–12. A close reading of this wording interprets it as applying to foreign relations
cases. But these three factors seem to be just restatements of the two jurisdictional categories plus the
catch-all prudential category. And as to the broader political question doctrine, the Court also said:
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there should be no dismissal
for non-justiciability on the ground of a political question’s presence. The doctrine of which we
treat is one of “political questions,” not one of “political cases.” The courts cannot reject as “no
law suit” a bona fide controversy as to whether some action denominated “political” exceeds
constitutional authority. The cases we have reviewed show the necessity for discriminating inquiry
into the precise facts and posture of the particular case, and the impossibility of resolution by any
semantic cataloguing.
Id. at 217 (emphasis added). So, whether it is a “discriminating analysis” or “discriminating inquiry,” it
is always on a case-by-case basis.
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Now notice that Baker principles 1 and 2 are reformulations of Baker
factors 1 and 2, and that principle 3 is an amalgam of Baker factors 3 through
6. But the Baker principles are more than only reformulations of the Baker
factors. They free courts’ rationale from the strictures of the more
“semantic cataloguing” of the Baker factors in favor of a set of principles
more faithful to the framework of the Constitution—particularly to the
separation of powers—and the courts’ role of judicial review in foreign
relations and national security cases.171
The first Baker principle is compatible with the Youngstown framework.
That is, considering the history of the management of the war powers by
the political branches, it is appropriate to determine if the president’s power
(as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief) is at its maximum, in the
twilight zone of concurrent authority, or at its lowest ebb.172 Next, under
the second Baker principle, it is appropriate to consider whether and to what
extent the precise legal question is susceptible “to judicial handling in the
light of its nature and posture in the specific case.”173 Finally, consideration
is appropriate on the possible consequences of judicial action.
The changing character of war and warfare make the discriminating
analysis imperative.
V. THE DISCRIMINATING ANALYSIS IMPERATIVE
When historian David Crist wrote his history on the “twilight war”
between the United States and Iran, he used the twilight metaphor to
describe the space between war and peace.174 Still, the phrase could just as
well have alluded to Justice Jackson’s three-part framework.175 As with the
naval operation implicated in Koohi,176 most military operations occur in

171. Id. at 217.
172. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
173. Baker, 369 U.S. at 211.
174. DAVID CRIST, THE TWILIGHT WAR: THE SECRET HISTORY OF AMERICA’S THIRTYYEAR CONFLICT WITH IRAN 4–5 (2012) (“Twilight is an accurate metaphor for the current state of
affairs between the United States and Iran. . . . For three decades, the two nations have been suspended
between war and peace.”).
175. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–38.
176. Punctuating the twilight wars was the naval operation at issue in Koohi, operation Earnest
Will. Cox, supra note 1. President Ronald Reagan did not seek congressional authorization for the
operation. CASPAR W. WEINBERGER, A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
IN THE PERSIAN GULF 21 (1987) (“[T]here is no basis at the present time for concluding that the [War
Powers] Resolution will apply . . . .”). Weinberger was Secretary of Defense under President Reagan.
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these two zones of twilight.177 Therefore, resolving the Koohi problem calls
for an application of Baker’s discriminating analysis of the particular
question. Two cases demonstrate the point.
A. Tarros S.p.A. v. United States
In 2011, to quell civil unrest in his country, Muammar Qadhafi, dictator
of Libya, authorized (ordered) the country’s military forces to silence
protestors.178 Civilians, men and women alike, were to be silenced, even if
that meant maimed or killed.179 The U.N. Security Council (UNSC)
unanimously resolved to intervene.180 With Resolutions 1970 and 1973,
the UNSC instituted, among other measures, an arms embargo on the
Libyan government.181 The Resolution instructed U.N. member states to
enforce the embargo and take all necessary measures to protect civilians and
civilian-populated areas.182
Under orders of United States President Barack Obama, in March 2011,
the U.S. initiated Operation Odyssey Dawn to enforce Resolution 1973.183
On 22 March, U.S. naval warship the USS Stout interdicted, questioned, and
turned away the Vento—a commercial cargo ship flying the flag of
Cyprus—as it made its way toward the Libyan coast, bound for Tripoli.184
At some point, the ship sustained damage.185 The company that contracted
for the Vento alleged damages due to negligence of the U.S. naval forces.186
The plaintiff claimed the U.S. naval forces’ actions were contrary to the
Resolutions, a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Warning, and
international maritime law, specifically the United Nations Convention on
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).187
The district court took up the matter on the question of “whether the
Stout—and by implication, the military—had a duty under international law
to conduct operations in a specified manner, and acted negligently in the
177. BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON & SOFIA PLAGAKIS, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R42738,
INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-2020, at 2 (2020).
178. Tarros S.p.A. v. United States, 982 F. Supp. 2d 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 328.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 329.
185. Id. at 327.
186. Id. at 330.
187. The United States and is not a party to UNCLOS.
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performance of that duty by blockading and diverting the Vento.”188 The
district court was careful. It announced: “It is well established, however,
that the political question doctrine generally precludes judicial review of
discretionary military decisions related to military operations.”189 The court
said “such cases typically implicate Baker’s first two factors.”190 And, in
applying the first factor, it found that not only does the Constitution commit
military decisions to the political branches, but “[m]ilitary judgments such
as these are paradigmatic of discretionary decisions constitutionally
committed to the Executive Branch.”191
Citing a Fourth Circuit case from 1991,192 the district court stated
“adjudication would require the Court to wade into the heart of military
operations, interjecting tort law into the realm of national security and
second-guessing judgments . . . that are properly left to the other constituent
branches of government.”193 The district court also found that there were
no judicially manageable standards (Baker factor two) on which to judge
“what would be ‘reasonable’ under the circumstances.”194
And it is here that the district court confronted the error of the Paquete
Habana and the Koohi problem: “In the face of ample case law indicating that
this dispute is not justiciable, Plaintiff cites two cases—the Paquete Habana
and Koohi v. United States—that allowed tort actions for damages challenging
military discretion related to military operations.”195 The district court
explained in the plainest language why the error of the Paquete Habana is of
little legal consequence:
While Habana and Koohi add a wrinkle to the analysis in this case, they do not
change the result. Habana is inapposite for at least three reasons. First,
whereas Congress has expressly granted jurisdiction to federal courts over
prize causes, . . . no statute or treaty authorizes courts to determine whether
military actions taken to enforce international obligations such as Resolutions
1970 and 1973 were justified, and the Court will not read into general statutes
such as the [Public Vessels Act] and the [Suits in Admiralty Act] jurisdiction
188. Tarros, 982 F. Supp. 2d at 333.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 334.
191. Id. (emphasis added).
192. Tiffany v. United States, 931 F.2d 271 (4th. Cir. 1991).
193. Tarros, 982 F. Supp. 2d at 334 (quoting Tiffany v. United States, 931 F.2d 271, 275 (4th Cir.
1991)) (internal quotations omitted).
194. Id. at 336.
195. Id. at 337 (citations omitted).
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to make such determinations . . . . Second, in Habana, the Executive
petitioned the judiciary to review the prize for condemnation. In contrast, in
this case the Government is the defendant and contends that the Court lacks
jurisdiction. Third, Habana predates Erie, which established that there is no
federal general common law. Habana’s reliance upon customary international
law as a matter of federal general common law to restrain the Executive’s
military discretion is therefore no longer warranted.196

The district court did not mention that the Supreme Court in the Paquete
Habana was sitting as a prize court and so its holding was a narrow one,
applicable only to prize cases.197 For all these reasons, the Paquete Habana
should not be of much legal consequence. Still, the case shows that the
Paquete Habana, its error notwithstanding, remains of practical consequence.
In addressing the question presented, the district court in Tarros went on
to weigh the “Effect of International Law on Military Discretion.”198
Finding that Resolutions 1970 and 1973 and the NATO Warning were not
self-executing such as to create domestically enforceable legal rights, the
district court then turned to the application of UNCLOS.199
The United States had not (and has not) ratified UNCLOS, so, as the
court explained: “To the extent that Plaintiff invokes UNCLOS, the Court
understands it to argue—and assumes arguendo—that the Convention’s
provisions are reflective of customary international law and, therefore,
would inform the standard of care by which the military is bound.”200 With
restraint, the district court said: “In light of the Court’s conclusion that this
case presents a political question, UNCLOS is irrelevant.”201 This point is
worth repeating. Customary international law is irrelevant to whether a
matter presents a nonjusticiable political question.
If a case or controversy should bring the Supreme Court to overturn the
Paquete Habana, the Court would do well to take a page—or all of them—
from Tarros. But Tarros is a district court case. Without appellate
endorsement, Tarros is far from having settled the issue of the nonjusticiability of matters of Commander-in-Chief discretion in federal courts.

196. Tarros, 982 F. Supp. 2d at 337–38 (citations omitted). The court’s third listed reason is
significant but beyond the scope of this Article.
197. Sweeney, supra note 105, at 483.
198. Tarros, 982 F. Supp. 2d at 339.
199. Id. at 344.
200. Id.
201. Id.
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The issue came up again in 2015 in the Fourth Circuit case of Wu Tien LiShou v. United States.202
B. Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States
In 2010, Somali pirates raided and commandeered a Taiwanese fishing
vessel—the Jin Chun Tsai 68 (JCT 68)—and held it and its men hostage,
including Wu Lai-Yu, the owner and master, and two Chinese crewmen.203
In 2011, a NATO task force came under orders to “shadow and then disrupt
the pirate mothership JCT 68.”204 On 10 May 2011, the warship USS
Groves confronted the JCT 68 and ordered the pirates to surrender on the
order of the task force commander. The pirates refused to comply, and an
hour-long firefight ensued.205 When the men boarded the vessel, they
found Master Wu shot dead.206
Years later, Master Wu’s widow, Wu Tien Li-Shou, sued for wrongful
death and negligent destruction of property under several federal
statutes.207 The district court and the Fourth Circuit dismissed for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction, having determined that the matter presented a
nonjusticiable political question.208
The district court based its holding on the determination that the alleged
negligence that caused the death of Master Wu and the destruction of the
ship arose from an operation by a U.S. naval vessel in “an act of
belligerency,” and the “[t]he Navy sank the JCT 68 under direct orders from
the allied commander of the NATO-led operation.”209 The district court
emphasized the following facts:
It is alleged in the complaint, and for purposes of the pending motion it is
assumed to be true, that (1) when the USS Groves fired the shots that killed
Master [Wu Lai-]Yu,210 it positioned itself beyond the firing range of the
202. Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 777 F.3d 175 (4th Cir. 2015).
203. Id. at 179.
204. Id. In 2009, NATO initiated Operation Ocean Shield to combat piracy in the Gulf of
Aden and around the Horn of Africa. Id.
205. Id. at 179.
206. Id.
207. The Public Vessels Act, the Suits in Admiralty Act, and the Death on the High Seas Act.
208. Wu Tien Li-Shou, 777 F.3d at 178.
209. Wu Tien Li-Shou v. United States, 997 F. Supp. 2d 307, 309–10 (D. Md. 2014).
210. The District Court referred to the decedent as “Yu,” which is in fact his first (given) name,
and only part of it. It is a custom of Chinese and Taiwanese culture to put the family name (surname)
first. So, Tien Li-Shou carries her married name Wu, and the deceased is properly referred to by his
family name Wu.
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pirates’ weapons, (2) the shots that were fired hit the JCT 68 on the starboard
[right-hand] side of the ship, well aft [back] of the bow [front], and (3) the
USS Groves used exploding ordnance [artillery] rather than inert ordnance as
would have been appropriate.211

After determining that the matter presented a nonjusticiable political
question, the Fourth Circuit addressed domestic sovereign immunity. The
following passage deserves highlight:
Wu also challenges the district court’s holding that the United States retains
its sovereign immunity from suit because it was engaged in the exercise of a
discretionary function. While this is framed as an alternative ground for
decision, it decidedly is not because the political question doctrine and the
discretionary function exception to waivers of sovereign immunity overlap
here in important respects.212

But while “Wu insist[ed] that the USS Groves acted in contravention of
law and thus that the government [could not] claim the discretionary
function exception as a safe harbor, . . . Wu [still did] not identify a law that
would permissibly have circumscribed the USS Groves’s course of
action.”213 In the end, the Fourth Circuit emphasized: “The [Suits in
Admiralty Act] and the [Public Vessels Act] both waive sovereign immunity
for in personam admiralty suits,” but that, “[n]either statute contains an
explicit exception to the scope of its waiver.”214 The Fourth Circuit
nevertheless applied the discretionary function exception to the Acts.215
The Supreme Court declined review in October 2015.216
The current realities of warfare call for some revisions to the law of
justiciability and domestic sovereign immunity. Specifically, the appellate
jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court and the original and appellate
jurisdiction of the federal courts should be expressly limited to exclude
matters of wartime military discretion and Commander-in-Chief discretion.
Also, the combatant immunities and discretionary function exceptions in
the Federal Tort Claims Act should be expressed across all legislative

211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.

Wu Tien Li-Shou, 997 F. Supp. 2d at 309.
Wu Tien Li-Shou, 777 F.3d at 183.
Id. at 185 (citation omitted).
Id. at 183–84.
Id. at 184.
Li-Shou v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 139 (2015).
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enactments that waive the sovereign immunity of the U.S. Government and
its agents acting under lawful orders.
VI. CONCLUSION
The error of the Paquete Habana is that the Supreme Court failed to
recognize that the case concerned a matter of wartime military discretion.217
On the Admiral’s orders, the fishing boats’ captured crewmen were to be
detained as prisoners of war, the ships to be taken to the army garrison at
Key West.218 This implicated the military necessity exception to the rule
that exempted coastal fishing boats from capture as prize.219 Yet, the Court
applied the rule without applying the exception.220 As a result, the Court’s
inference that the Admiral violated higher orders was wrong. According to
the joint resolution authorizing the use of military force and the Declaration
of War, a state of war had existed since the 21st of April.221 In addition,
the President’s and the Admiral’s rules of engagement expressed that the
war was to be conducted in harmony with international law and applicable
customary norms. Thus, the Admiral’s judgment that the crewmen were
likely to aid the enemy was an extension of the Commander-in-Chief’s
wartime military discretion.
The Koohi proposition carried forward the Paquete Habana error by
asserting matters of Commander-in-Chief discretion are subject to judicial
review. This proposition threatens to have a chilling effect on military
operations. Resolving the Koohi problem requires a discriminating analysis
of the particular question posed. In matters of warfare, the political question
doctrine calls for the courts to defer to Commander-in-Chief discretion and
the law of war.

217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

Koohi v. United States, 976 F.2d 1328, 1332 (9th Cir. 1992).
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 713 (1900).
Id. at 718.
See generally id.
Id. at 712.
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